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Abstract. We present a game model for classical PCF, a nite version
of PCF extended by a catch/throw mechanism. This model is build
from E-dialogues, a kind of two-players game dened by Lorenzen. In
the E-dialogues for classical PCF, the strategies of the rst player are
isomorphic to the Bohm trees of the language.
We dene an interaction in E-dialogues and show that it models the
weak-head reduction in classical PCF. The interaction is a variant of
Coquand's debate and the weak-head reduction is a variant of the re-
duction in Krivine's Abstract Machine.
We then extend E-dialogues to a kind of games similar to Hyland-Ong's
games. Interaction in these games also models weak-head reduction. In
the intuitionistic case (i.e. without the catch/throw mechanism), the
extended E-dialogues are Hyland-Ong's games where the innocence con-
dition on strategies is now a rule.
Our model for classical PCF is dierent from Ong's model of Parigot's
lambda-mu-calculus. His model works by adding new moves to the intu-
itionistic case while ours works by relaxing the game rules.
Introduction
We investigate the links between Lorenzen's and Coquand's game-theoretic ap-
proach of provability, Hyland-Ong's game-theoretic approach of -calculus, and
weak-head reduction as implemented by Krivine's Abstract Machine.
To exemplify these links, we choose as framework the nite Bohm trees of a
variant of PCF extended by a catch/throw mechanism. This variant of PCF is
classical in the sense that its typing system includes implicational classical logic.
We refer to Felscher [8] for the works of Lorenzen and his school. According
to Felscher, the goal of Lorenzen was to give a game-based foundation of in-
tuitionistic logic. Several kinds of two-players games parametrized by formulas
were dened. Of these games, we note one in particular, called E-dialogues in
Felscher [8]. As noticed by Lorenzen & Schwemmer [16], the strategies for the
rst player in E-dialogues have a structure of proofs in a certain cut-free sequent
?
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calculus. The propositional fragment of this calculus is described in [10]. It is a
variant of Gentzen's calculus LJ.
More generally, we call E-dialogue the kind of game which game-theoretically
expresses the terms or proofs typed by a system having the subformula property.
In particular, Coquand's games [3] (inspired from Gentzen [2]) for innitary
propositional logic are E-dialogues. Similarly, the typing system of Bohm trees
for PCF has the subformula property and we can dene E-dialogues for PCF.
We focus in section 1 on Bohm trees for classical PCF. Before dening E-
dialogues for classical PCF, we dene in section 2 a generic notion of two-players
games parametrized by types. It's only by restricting the rules of the generic
games that we get E-dialogues (see section 3). An isomorphism between Bohm
trees for classical PCF and strategies for the rst player in E-dialogues can now
be stated. However, the rules of the E-dialogues are not the same for both players.
So we dene in section 4 spread E-dialogues where the players have dual roles.
In spread E-dialogues both the strategies of the rst player and of the second
player are in one-to-one correspondence with Bohm trees.
In section 5, we recover E-dialogues and spread E-dialogues for intuitionistic
PCF by another extra restriction, called last asked rst answered condition. In-
tuitionistic spread E-dialogues are Hyland-Ong's dialogues where the innocence
condition on strategies is now a rule of the game. The observation that the last
asked rst answered condition distinguishes between classical and intuitionistic
type systems comes from Lorenz [13].
It is possible to dene an interaction between strategies in an E-dialogue (in a
way similar to Coquand's interaction [3]), but also in a spread E-dialogue (in this
case it is just a \ping-pong"-like process). On the other side, we can evaluate the
application of a Bohm tree to another by using a variant of Krivine's Abstract
Machine. This is the weak-head reduction. We show that both interactions model
the weak-head reduction.
The correspondence between weak-head reduction and interaction in Hyland-
Ong's style of games is also proven in Danos et al [6]. The framework was the
simply-typed pure -calculus and the starting point was the analogy between
the justication pointers in Hyland-Ong's games and the pointers introduced in
Danos & Regnier [7] to implement Krivine's Abstract Machine.
A game-theoretic model of simply-typed pure -calculus (see Parigot [18])
has been given by Ong [17]. It derives from the intuitionistic game by adding
new moves. In contrast, our model for classical PCF results from a liberalization
of the rules of the intuitionistic game.
Interaction between strategies can be formalized through abstract machines
too. The relations between these machines and Krivine's Abstract Machine are
shown in [5].
1 Classical Simply-Typed Bohm Trees
We consider a language of Bohm trees for a simply-typed -calculus including
constants, a case operator and a catch/throwmechanism (with static binding).
We adopt for the catch and throw operators a syntax (and later a behaviour)
reminiscent of Parigot's -calculus [18]. The operator catch

is written 
and the operator throw

is written []. Classical Bohm trees are dened by the
following grammar:
t ::= case x(u; :::; u) of (c! t; :::; c! t) j []c
u ::= x; :::; x::t
The letters x and  range over two distinct domains of names and c over the
constants in the base types. The x's are called -variables. They are supposed to
be distinct in the expression x; :::; x::. The 's are called -variables (they
roughly correspond to entry points of (local) functions). In the case construct,
the c's are supposed to be distinct and the t's are called continuations.We will
often use a vector notation as in ~x::t or case x(~u) of (~c!
~
t).
The objects dened by the entries t and u are respectively called classical
evaluable Bohm trees and classical functional Bohm trees.
Our Bohm trees are simply-typed. Types are built on a family V
C
of base
types, each one being inhabited by a nite number of elements. The following
grammar denes types
A ::= A; :::; A!C
where the sequence A; :::; A may be empty and where C ranges over V
C
.
In a type A = B
1
; :::; B
p
!C the base type C is called conclusion of A and
each B
i
is called premise of A.
The typing system has two kinds of sequents. The sequents (  ` ) type
evaluable Bohm trees and the sequents (  ` ;A) type functional Bohm trees.
The   's are sequences of types annotated by -variables. The 's are sequences
of base types annotated by -variables. The typing rules are:
t : ( ;A
x
1
1
; :::; A
x
n
n
` ;C

)
x
1
; :::; x
n
::t : (  ` ;A
1
; :::; A
n
!C)
Abs
c is in C
[]c : (  ` ;C

)
Cst
u
1
: (  ` ;A
1
) : : : u
n
: (  ` ;A
n
) t
1
: (  ` ) : : : t
p
: (  ` )
case x(u
1
; :::; u
n
) of (c
1
! t
1
; :::; c
p
! t
p
) : (  ` )
App
with (A
1
; :::; A
n
!C)
x
in   and C = fc
1
; :::; c
p
g.
If u : (`;A), we say that u is a closed Bohm tree of type A.
Remarks: 1) The extension to innite set of constants and/or to non well-
founded Bohm trees poses no diculties. The extension to Bohm trees with
undened nodes is also direct.
2) We justify our langage of Bohm trees as follows. Let
t ::= x j (t t) j x:t
j c j case t of (c! t; :::; c! t)
j catch

t j throw

t
be a grammar for a nite version of PCF with a catch/throw mechanism. In
fact, we intend catch

t to represent the construction []t of -calculus and
throw

t the construction []t with  not in t. This is justied by the following
derived rule of -calculus ( and  not in t)
E([]E
0
([]t))! E(t)
where E and E
0
are applicative contexts and []t is in evaluation position
in E
0
.
Consider the theory of -calculus with constants and case operators
(x:t u) = t[x :=u]
t = x:(t x) x fresh for t
t = case t of (~c! ~c)
case c
i
of (~c!
~
t) = t
i
(case t of (~c! ~u) v) = case t of (~c!
  !
(u v))
case (case t of (~c!
~
t)) of (
~
c
0
!
~
t
0
) = case t of (~c!
             !
case t of (
~
c
0
!
~
t
0
))
enriched by equations coming from the theory of -calculus
t = catch

t  fresh for t
(catch

t u) = catch

(t[throw

v :=throw

(v u)] u)
(throw

t u) = throw

t
case (catch

t) of (~c! ~u) = catch

(case t
0
of (~c! ~u))
where t
0
= t[throw

v :=throw

(case v of (~c! ~u))]
case (throw

t) of (~c! ~u) = throw

t
throw

(case t of (~c!
~
t)) = case t of (~c!
     !
throw

t)
throw

(throw

t) = throw

t
throw

(catch

t) = throw

(t[ :=])
catch

(catch

t) = catch

(t[ :=])
catch

c = catch

throw

c
where the various substitutions are dened as in Parigot [18] (replacing throw

by []).
Orient the rules from left to right to get a rewriting system. We can show
that any typed term reduced to a typed Bohm tree. Up to the 2nd, 3rd and
7th rules, typed Bohm trees are normal. Thus, assuming the conuence of the
rewriting system, the typed Bohm trees describe the equivalence classes of typed
terms. This justies the terminology.
3) According to the theory of -calculus in Parigot [18], any term of the form
[]t is equivalent to [][]t with  fresh for t. This justies to abbreviate
our catch

t (i.e. []t) by :t and our throw

t (i.e. []t with  not in t)
by []t.
A precise study of the relations between -calculus and -calculus extended
by catch and throw can be found in Crolard [4].
Numeric Bohm trees are a special case of Bohm trees. In numeric Bohm
trees, the -variables range over pairs of natural numbers and -variables on
natural numbers. We will use numeric Bohm trees in section 3.1 to prove the
correspondence with strategies. The numbers are imposed by the following an-
notated typing system:
t : ( ; A
(
p
1
)
1
; :::;A
(
p
n
)
n
p
` ;C

)
(
p
1
); :::; (
p
n
)::t : ( 
p
` ;A
1
; :::;A
n
!C)
Abs
c is in C
[p]c : ( 
p
` ;C
p
)
Cst
u
1
: ( 
p+1
` ;A
1
) : : : u
n
: ( 
p+1
` ;A
n
) t
1
: ( 
p+1
` ) : : : t
p
: ( 
p+1
` )
case (
q
j
)(u
1
; :::; u
n
) of (c
1
! t
1
; :::; c
p
! t
p
) : ( 
p
` )
App
with (A
1
; :::;A
n
!C)
(
q
j
)
in   and C = fc
1
; :::; c
p
g.
1.1 Weak-Head Reduction
We now dene a computation on classical Bohm trees: the weak-head computa-
tion of a functional Bohm tree applied to arguments which are themselves Bohm
trees. For this purpose, we dene a variant of Krivine's Abstract Machine. The
machine is described in a syntax reminiscent of -calculi (see Abadi et al [1]),
in the style of Leroy [12] or Hardin et al [9].
s ::= t[e]
e ::= w; :::;w
w ::= (~x ~u; []~c!
~
t)[e]
A state of the machine (entry s of the grammar) consists of an evaluable
Bohm tree in an environment. An environment e is a sequence of windows.
A window w contains bindings of two kinds. First the bindings of variables to
arguments. Second the bindings of a -variable and of constants to continuations.
Both terms and continuations of a window have meaning in an environment local
to them.
There are two kinds of rules. The rst rule applies when the computation
needs to know the value of a variable x
ij
. If x
ij
is bound to u
ij
= ~y::t
0
in
e then its arguments ~u are bound to the formal parameters ~y and the current
continuation
~
t (what to do when t
0
returns a constant) is bound to the entry
point  of u
ij
.
case x
ij
(~u) of (~c!
~
t)[e]
wh
!
1
t
0
[(~y  ~u; []~c!
~
t)[e]; e
i
]
with e = w
1
; :::;w
r
and w
i
= (~x
i
 ~u
i
; [
i
]~c
i
!
~
t
i
)[e
i
] and u
ij
= ~y::t
0
.
The second rule applies when a constant is return to some entry point.
[
i
]c
j
[e]
wh
!
1
t
ij
[e
i
]
with e = w
1
; :::;w
r
and w
i
= (~x
i
 ~u
i
; [
i
]~c
i
!
~
t
i
)[e
i
].
The weak-head reduction works by repeatedly applying the two rules. Let
u
0
=  ~x
0
:
0
:t
0
be a Bohm tree of type
~
A!C and ~v
0
a family of Bohm trees
of respective types A
1
; :::; A
n
. The weak-head reduction of u
0
applied to ~v
0
is the following sequence:
r
0
= t
0
[( ~x
0
 ~v
0
; [
0
])[ ]
wh
!
1
r
1
wh
!
1
:::
wh
!
1
r
n
wh
!
1
:::
The symbol  denotes the empty sequence of continuations bindings. When
u
0
and ~v
0
are closed (both for -variables and -variables), only the constants
returned on 
0
are not bound in the environment. This property is preserved
from step to step. Thus, if it stops, the sequence stops in a state of the form
[
0
]c
i
[e]. Since no continuation is bound to [
0
]c
i
, no reduction rule applies.
Remark: Our machine arises as a stack-free form of Krivine's Abstract Machine.
The typing ensures that the arity of arguments always matches the arity of
formal parameters. This is what allows to avoid a stack. The way to handle case
operators without stack comes from [5]. More generally, we refer to [5] for a
comparison of our machine with Danos-Regnier Pointer Abstract Machine (see
[7, 6]) and for an extension to pure -calculus. A short proof of correctness of
the machine w.r.t. Coquand's debate (as done in section 3.2) also appears in [5].
2 Games
Games interpret types. If A is a type, we write G
A
the game which interprets it.
It is a game between two players called Player and Opponent. Moves consist in
attacks of subtypes of A or in answers to attacks. Plays are alternating sequences
of numbered Player's and Opponent's moves starting from an initial attack of A
by Opponent.
Assume A is B
1
; :::; B
n
! C
0
. The initial attack of A is written [

and
numbered 0. This attack means both a question on the conclusion C
0
of A and
the assertion of the premises B
i
of A. All subsequent attacks are written [
p
i
.
The exponent p is called justication. It is a reference to a previous attack of
the other player, say the attack of B
0
1
; :::; B
0
n
!C
0
. This attack was asserting B
0
1
,
...,B
0
n
and i is the index of one of the B
0
1
, ..., B
0
n
. Here again, the attack means
both a question on the conclusion of B
0
i
and the assertion of each premise of B
0
i
.
An attack is waiting for an answer. An answer is written ]
p
c
. The exponent
p is also a justication. It corresponds to the number of the attack to which
it answers. This attack was questioning a base type, say C
00
and c is a constant
in C
00
.
Formally, the game G
A
is a set of legal positions on A. A legal position
on A is a nite or innite sequence d
0
d
1
d
2
::: of moves. For n  1, it may be
convenient to write d
n
as m
p
n
n
. The number p
n
is the justication and m
n
is
either [
i
or ]
c
. To be a legal position, the sequence has to satisfy the following
properties:
- Initial attack of Opponent
We have d
0
= [

.
- Moves are justied by previous moves of the other player
For all n > 0, p
n
is less than n and of distinct parity.
- Correctness of attacks
For n  1, if d
n
= [
p
i
, the move d
p
is an attack of some type
B
1
; :::; B
m
! C and 1  i  m. We say that d
n
is an attack of
B
i
.
- Correctness of answers
For n  1, if d
n
= ]
p
c
, the move d
p
is an attack of some type
B
1
; :::; B
m
!C and c is in C.
The moves d
n
, with n odd, are called Player's moves or P-moves and the
ones with n even are called Opponent's moves or O-moves.
2.1 Strategies
Unformally, a strategy for a player is a function mapping legal positions (at
which the player is to move) to a move of this player. In a legal position, only
the moves of the other player are useful to determine what to move. This leads
to the following denition.
Assume A is B
1
; :::; B
n
0
!C. A P-strategy (resp O-strategy)  for G
A
is
a function which maps nite sequences of O-moves (resp P-moves) to P-moves
(resp O-moves). The domainDom() of  is structured as a tree. It satises the
following clauses:
- For a P -strategy: the sequence reduced to the single O-move [

is inDom().
- For an O-strategy: the one-P-move sequences ]
0
c
(with c in C
0
) and [
0
i
(with
1  i  n
0
) are in Dom().
- If the sequence d
0
d
1
:::d
n
is in Dom() then,
1- d
0
(d
0
)d
1
:::d
n
(d
0
:::d
n
) forms a legal position,
2- d
0
d
1
:::d
n+1
is in Dom() if and only if d
0
(d
0
)d
1
:::d
n
(d
0
:::d
n
)d
n+1
forms a legal position.
P-strategies are strategies for Player while O-strategies are strategies for
Opponent.
Alternatively, a P-strategy can be seen as a (possibly innite) tree where
branches are labelled by O-moves and nodes by P-moves. Moreover, it makes
sense to restrict a strategy to what it determines after some point in a play. This
leads to the denition of substrategy in tree form beyond a legal position.
A P-substrategy in tree form beyond  is inductively dened by:
Let d be a P-move such that d is legal. If, for any O-move d
0
such that
dd
0
is legal, 
d
0
is a P-substrategy beyond dd
0
, then the tree (d; (
d
0
)
d
0
)
is a P-substrategy beyond .
The move d labels the root node of the tree and the 
d
0
are the branches.
When no O-move is allowed after d, the family (
d
0
)
d
0
is empty and the P-
substrategy is restricted to a leaf. A P-strategy in tree form is a P-substrategy
in tree form beyond the legal position restricted to the initial move [

.
Proposition1. There is a one-to-one correspondence between strategies (as de-
ned by the rst denition) and strategies in tree-form. This correspondence
preserves the tree structure of the domains of the strategies.
The notion of P-substrategies in tree form beyond a legal position is a tech-
nical notion used to prove the correspondence with Bohm trees.
3 The Model of E-Dialogues
Coquand [3] interprets proofs of the \Calculus of Noviko" as strategies in a
two-players game. The calculus is a (cut-free) sequent calculus (as LJ and LK of
Gentzen) for innitary logic. The game is as in section 2 except for Opponent:
the O-moves must be justied by the preceding P-move. Such a game is similar
to Lorenzen's classical E-dialogues in Felscher [8].
Here, we dene E-dialogues for classical Bohm trees.
3.1 E-Dialogues
The E-dialogue G
E
A
interpreting the type A is dened by its set of legal E-
positions. A legal E-position on A is a legal position in G
A
which satises the
following extra condition:
- O-moves are justied by the preceding P-move:
For all even n 6= 0, we have p
n
= n  1.
The justications of O-moves are trivial in E-dialogues. We do not write them
in the sequel.
An E-P-strategy for A is a P-strategy for the E-dialogue G
E
A
.
Proposition2. E-P-strategies for A and closed functional Bohm trees of type
A are isomorphic.
Proof. We show rather the correspondence between E-P-strategies in tree form
and numeric Bohm trees. Let  be a legal E-position of odd length. Let   be
the set of types asserted by Opponent (and thus attackable by Player) in . Let
 be the types of the questions asked by Opponent. We tag each type in   by
a pair consisting of the move number when the type was asserted and of the
premise index (as in the denition of numeric Bohm trees). Similarly, we tag
each base type in  by the move number when the question was asked. We show
that E-P-substrategies in tree form beyond  are isomorphic to evaluable Bohm
trees typed by the sequent (  ` ).
For well-founded strategies and Bohm trees, the denition of the correspon-
dence is by recursion on the tree structure:
{ A P-attack [
p
i
corresponds to an occurrence of the App rule with head-
variable (
p
i
). Branches indexed by an O-move correspond to subderivations
of the App rule.
 An O-attack [
i
corresponds to the i
th
left premise of the rule App (to-
gether with the subsequent Abs rule).
 An O-answer ]
c
i
corresponds to the i
th
right premise of the rule App.
{ A P-answer ]
p
c
corresponds to an occurrence of the Cst rule with constant c
and type C
p
.
Finally, the initial move [

is in correspondence with the top Abs rule of
functional Bohm trees. Then, it is direct to show that the correspondence is an
isomorphism respecting the tree structure.
Hereafter, we write 
u
for the E-P-strategy associated to the Bohm tree u.
3.2 Coquand's Debate
Let  be an E-P-strategy for A
1
; :::; A
n
!C and
~
 be a family of E-P-strategies
forA
1
; :::; A
n
respectively. Since neither  and
~
 are forced to playmoves justied
by the preceding opponent's move, it is not possible to directly let them interact.
Coquand [3] proposed a way to let  and
~
 interact in such a way that the
interaction computes a result for C. The idea of Coquand is as follows: at each
step of the debate (which is a sequence of moves), there is a canonical way to
extract a subsequence which is a legal E-position. From this legal E-position,
the E-strategies can be applied. Following Hyland-Ong's terminology [11], we
call view the extracted E-position. However, in contrast with [11], when Player
(resp Opponent) is to move, we keep in the view only the moves of Opponent
(resp Player). This is sucient to apply the E-strategies.
Roughly, the view (typically for P) of a legal position is obtained by forgetting
the moves which occur between an O-move and the P-move which justied it.
Formally, the view V() of a legal sequence  = d
0
d
1
:::d
n
is recursively
dened as follows:
- If d
n
= m
p
with p 6= 0 then V(d
0
:::d
n
) = V(d
0
:::d
p 1
)m
- If d
n
= m
0
then V(d
0
:::d
n
) = m
- V(d
0
) = d
0
If the last move of  is a P-move, the view is an O-view. Otherwise, it is a
P-view.
Each move in the view of  is a move in  with the justication dropped.
The view renumbering sequence v

, dened as follows, tells the number that
the moves of the view have in .
- If d
n
= m
p
with p 6= 0 then v
d
0
:::d
n
= v
d
0
:::d
p 1
n
- If d
n
= m
0
then v
d
0
:::d
n
= n
- v
d
0
= 0
If v

= v
0
v
1
:::v
n
0
is the view renumbering sequence of . If d = m
p
is a move
with p  n
0
, we note v

(d) for the move m
v
p
.
The debate d
E
(;
~
 ) between  and
~
 forms a legal position. Both  and
the  
i
in
~
 are E-P-strategies but in the resulting play, who plays according to
 is Player and who plays according to the  
i
is Opponent. The rst move is an
initial attack of Opponent questioning C. Then, both players play in turn:
d
0
= [

d
2n+1
= v
d
0
:::d
2n
((V(d
0
:::d
2n
)))
d
2n+2
= v
d
0
:::d
2n+1
(
~
 (V(d
0
:::d
2n+1
)))
d
E
(;  ) = d
0
d
1
:::d
n
:::
where
~
 (m
0
m
1
:::m
q
) is  
i
([

m
1
:::m
q
) when m
0
is [
i
.
Thus, the view transposes the current state of the debate into a subsequence
of O-moves in an E-dialogue. From this, the player who is to move can apply its
strategy. The view renumbering sequences serve to transpose back the justica-
tion in the whole position.
3.3 Debate Models Weak-Head Reduction
Let u
0
=  ~x
0
:
0
:t
0
be a Bohm tree of type A
1
; :::; A
n
!C and ~v
0
a family of
Bohm trees of respective types A
1
; :::; A
n
. The debate d
E
(
u
0
;
~

v
0
) follows step
by step the weak-head reduction of u
0
applied to ~v
0
.
To express this correspondence, we consider the transposition d
wh
(u
0
; ~v
0
) of
the weak-head reduction into a legal position. We annotate instances of the rst
reduction rule by attacks and instances of the second by answers. A superscript
on windows is necessary too. At the end, we add a dummy window ()[ ] in the
second reduction rule (this simplies the numbering of windows in the next
proof).
case x
ij
(~u) of (~c!
~
t)[e]
wh(n)=[
p
j
 !
1
t
0
[(~y  ~u; []~c!
~
t)
n
[e]; e
i
]
with e = w
1
; :::;w
r
and w
i
= (~x
i
 ~u
i
; [
i
]~c
i
!
~
t
i
)
p
[e
i
] and u
ij
= ~y::t
0
.
[
i
]c
j
[e]
wh(n)=]
p
c
i
 !
1
t
ij
[()[ ]; e
i
]
with e = w
1
; :::;w
r
and w
i
= (~x
i
 ~u
i
; [
i
]~c
i
!
~
t
i
)
p
[e
i
].
Starting from r
0
= t
0
[( ~x
0
 ~v
0
; [
0
])
0
[ ]], we get the sequence
r
0
wh(1)=d
1
 !
1
r
1
wh(2)=d
2
 !
1
:::
wh(n)=d
n
 !
1
r
n
wh(n+1)=d
n+1
 !
1
:::
We write d
wh
(u
0
; v
0
) for the sequence [

; d
1
; :::; d
n
; :::.
We now state the correspondence.
Theorem3. If u
0
is a closed Bohm tree of type A
1
; :::; A
n
!C and ~v
0
a family
of closed Bohm trees of respective types A
1
; :::; A
n
then we have
d
wh
(u
0
; ~v
0
) = d
E
(
u
0
;
~

v
0
)
We need rst some denitions.
We dene occurrences of evaluable Bohm trees and hat occurrences of
functional Bohm trees in a functional Bohm tree u. Bohm subtrees and P-views
are in correspondence. To enforce this link, occurrences are taken to be P-views,
i.e. sequences of O-moves with the justication dropped.
{ ~x::t has hat occurrence
b
[

in itself
{ t has occurrence [

in ~x::t
{ If case x
p
(~y
1
:
1
:t
1
; :::;  ~y
n
:
n
:t
n
) of (c
1
! t
0
1
; :::; c
q
! t
0
q
) has occur-
rence  in u then ~y
i
:
i
:t
i
has hat occurrence
c
[
i
in u, t
i
has occurrence
[
i
in u and t
0
i
has occurrence ]
c
i
in u.
If u is a Bohm tree and  an occurrence of t in u, we dene u
j
as t. If ~v
is a family of Bohm trees and  = [

m
1
:::m
n
is an occurrence of t in v
i
, we let
~v
j[
i
m
1
:::m
n
= (v
i
)
j
. Similarly for hat occurrences.
We can now give the proof.
Proof. Let u
0
=  ~x
0
:
0
:t
0
. Let
r
0
wh(1)=d
1
 !
1
r
1
wh(2)=d
2
 !
1
:::
wh(n)=d
n
 !
1
r
n
wh(n+1)=d
n+1
 !
1
:::
be the weak-head reduction originating from r
0
= t
0
[( ~x
0
 ~v
0
; [
0
])
0
[ ]]. Let 
be the debate d
E
(
u
0
;
~

v
0
). We note 
jn
for the restriction of the debate to the
moves 0 to n.
We show by induction on n that r
n
= t
n
[e
n
] where
{ if n is even, t
n
= (u
0
)
jV(
jn
)
if n is odd, t
n
= (v
0
)
jV(
jn
)
{ e
n
is w
q
r
; :::;w
q
1
where r = jV(
jn
)j and q
i+1
= v

jn
(i)
{ w
0
is ( ~x
0
 ~v
0
; [
0
])
0
[ ]
if q is odd (resp q is even) and (~v
0
)
jV(
jq
)
(resp (u
0
)
jV(
jq
)
) is a constant c
then w
q+1
= ()[ ] otherwise w
q+1
= ( ~x
q
 ~u
q
; [
q
]~c
q
!
~
t
0
q
)
q
[e
q
] where
 if q is even, u
qj
= (u
0
)
j
d
V(
jq
)[
j
and t
0
qj
= (u
0
)
jV(
jq
)]
c
j
(q 6= 0)
 if q is odd, u
qj
= (~v
0
)
j
d
V(
jq
)[
j
and t
0
qj
= (~v
0
)
jV(
jq
)]
c
j
Clearly, r
0
satises this property.
Now if r
n
= t
n
[e
n
], what happens for r
n+1
? We suppose n odd (the case
n 6= 0 even is similar). We have to consider the two possible reduction steps:
{




t
n
= case x(
~
u
0
) of (
~
c
00
!
~
t
00
) with x = x
q
i
j
in e
n
and u
q
i
j
= 
~
x
0
:
0
:t
0
r
n+1
= t
0
[(
~
x
0
 
~
u
0
; [
0
]
~
c
00
!
~
t
00
)
n+1
[e
n
]; e
q
i
]
In this case, we have wh(n+ 1) = [
q
i
j
and V(
jn+1
) = V(
jq
i
) [
j
.
We show rst that t
0
= t
n+1
. We have u
q
i
j
= (~v
0
)
j
d
V(
jq
)[
j
. By denition of
the view, we get u
q
i
j
= (~v
0
)
j
d
V(
jn+1
)
and t
0
= (~v
0
)
jV(
jn+1
)
.
Then, we show [(
~
x
0
 
~
u
0
; [
0
]
~
c
00
!
~
t
00
)
n+1
[e
n
]; e
q
i
] = [e
n+1
] = [w
q
r
; :::;w
q
1
]
with r = jV(
jn+1
)j and q
i+1
= v

jn+1
(i). By denition of the view, we
actually have r = jV(
jq
i
)j+1 = jV(
jn+1
)j. By denition of the view and of
e
q
i
, the r rst windows actually are the windows w
q
1
to w
q
r 1
with q
k+1
=
v

jn+1
(k). But also v

jn+1
(r) = n+ 1. Then, u
0
j
(= (u
0
)
j
d
V(
jq
)[
j
by denition
of hat occurrences) is actually u
(n+1)j
and t
00
j
(= (u
0
)
jV(
jq
)]
c
j
by denition
of occurrences) is actually t
0
(n+1)j
.
{




t
n
= []c
j
with  = 
q
i
in e
n
r
n+1
= t
0
q
i
j
[()[ ]; e
q
i
]
Then we have wh(n+ 1) =]
q
i
c
j
and V(
jn+1
) = V(
jq
i
) ]
c
j
.
We show rst that t
0
q
i
j
= t
n+1
. We have t
0
q
i
j
= (~v
0
)
jV(
jq
i
)]
c
j
. By denition
of the view, this means t
0
q
i
j
= (~v
0
)
jV(
jn+1
)
as wanted.
We show then that [()[ ]; e
q
i
] = [e
n+1
] = [w
q
r
; :::;w
q
1
] with r = jV(
jn+1
)j
and q
i+1
= v

jn+1
(i). As above, this comes by induction hypothesis for win-
dows in e
q
i
. Moreover, t
n
= (u
0
)
jV(
jn
)
is a constant and w
n+1
is actually
dummy.
This ends the proof
4 The Model of Spread E-Dialogues
The E-dialogues are highly asymmetrical between Player and Opponent. A lib-
eralization of the rules leads to the spread E-dialogues. These dialogues can be
seen as a variant for classical PCF of Hyland-Ong's dialogues (see section 5).
4.1 Spread E-Dialogues
We now allow Opponent to play moves justied by a P-move which is not the
last move of Player. However, to keep a kind of dialogue which constitutes a
model, we internalize the determinism w.r.t. the view in the rules of the game.
This is the same view same move condition.
The spread E-dialogue G
S
A
associated to A is dened by its set of legal
spread E-positions. A legal spread E-position on A is a legal position  =
d
0
d
1
:::d
q
in G
A
which satises the following extra condition:
- same view same move condition
For all n; n
0
 q, if V(
jn
) = V(
jn
0
) then there is a move m
p
such
that both d
n+1
= v

jn
(m
p
) and d
n
0
+1
= v

jn
0
(m
p
).
A spread E-P-strategy for A is a P-strategy for the spread E-dialogue
G
S
A
. Similarly for an E-O-strategy. A spread E-strategy is either a spread
E-P-strategy or a spread E-O-strategy.
4.2 E-P-Strategies and Spread E-Strategies
Since the moves in spread E-strategies are determined by the views (which are
sequences of O-moves in E-dialogues), we can expect a bijection between E-P-
strategies and spread E-strategies (whatever the strategy is for Player or for
Opponent).
In the rest of the section, we consider P-views of sequences of O-moves and
O-views of sequences of P-moves. This makes sense since only the knowledge of
the moves of other player are relevant in the denition of the view.
Let  be an E-P-strategy for A. Let Dom(

) be the set of sequences  of
O-moves such that V() is inDom(). Let 

be the extension of  onDom(

)
dened by 

() = v

((V())).
Proposition4. If  is an E-P-strategy for A then 

is a spread E-P-strategy
for A.
Similarly, let
~
 be a family of E-P-strategies for A
1
; :::; A
n
respectively. Let
Dom(
~

+
) be the set of sequences  of P-moves (replacing the rst move [
0
i
by
[

) such that V() is in Dom(
i
). Let
~

+
be dened on Dom(
~

+
) by 
+
() =
v

(
i
(V(
0
))) when  begins with [
0
i
and 
0
is obtained from  by replacing [
0
i
by [

.
Proposition5. If
~
 is a family of E-P-strategies for A
1
; :::; A
n
then
~

+
is a
spread E-O-strategy for A
1
; :::; A
n
!C.
Conversely, a spread E-strategy can be restricted into a E-P-strategy by
keeping in the domain only the sequences which come from a legal E-position.
Let  be a spread E-P-strategy forA. We deneDom()
 
as the set of sequences
[

m
1
:::m
q
of O-moves such that [

m
1
1
:::m
2q 1
q
is in Dom(). Similarly, let  be
a spread E-O-strategy for A
1
; :::; A
n
! C. For each i, we dene Dom()
 
i
as
the set of sequences [

m
1
:::m
q
of O-moves such that [
0
i
m
2
1
:::m
2q
q
is a sequence of
P-moves in Dom().
Proposition6. 1. If  is a spread E-P-strategy for A then the restriction of 
on Dom()
 
is an E-P-strategy for A.
2. If  is a spread E-O-strategy for A
1
; :::; A
n
!C then the restriction of  on
Dom()
 
i
is an E-P-strategy for A
i
3. If  is an E-P-strategy for A then the restriction of 

on Dom(

)
 
is .
4. If
~
 is a family of E-P-strategies for A
1
; :::; A
n
respectively then the restric-
tion of
~
 
+
on Dom(

)
 
i
is  
i
.
Corollary 7. The followings are in bijection:
{ closed Bohm trees of type A
{ E-P-strategies for A
{ spread E-P-strategies for A.
Also, the followings are in bijection:
{ families of closed Bohm trees of respective types A
1
; :::; A
n
{ families of E-P-strategies for A
1
; :::; A
n
{ families of spread E-P-strategies for A
1
; :::; A
n
{ spread E-O-strategies for A
1
; :::; A
n
!C
4.3 Interaction Between Spread E-Strategies
Let  be a spread E-P-strategy for A
1
; :::; A
n
!C and
~
 a family of spread E-P-
strategies for A
1
; :::; A
n
. By corollary 7,
~
 can be seen as a spread E-O-strategy
	 for A
1
; :::; A
n
!C. Therefore, it is direct to dene an interaction between 
and
~
 by letting  and 	 play the one against the other.
We dene the debate d
S
(;
~
 ) as follows:
d
0
= [

d
2n+1
= (d
0
d
2
:::d
2n
)
d
2n+2
= 	 (d
1
d
3
:::d
2n+1
)
The interaction in a spread E-dialogue follows step by step the debate in an
E-dialogue.
Proposition8. If  is an E-P-strategy for A
1
; :::; A
n
! C and
~
 a family of
E-P-strategies for A
1
; :::; A
n
respectively, then we have
d
E
(;
~
 ) = d
S
(

;
~
 
+
)
Proof. Directly since 

() = v

((V())) and similarly for
~
 .
Corollary 9. If u
0
is a Bohm tree of type A
1
; :::; A
n
!C and ~v
0
is a family of
Bohm trees of types A
1
; :::; A
n
respectively then we have
d
wh
(u
0
; ~v
0
) = d
E
(
u
0
;
~

v
0
) = d
S
(

u
0
;
~

v
0
+
)
5 Intuitionistic PCF
5.1 Syntax and Typing of Intuitionistic Bohm Trees
Intuitionistic Bohm trees for PCF are dened by the following restricted
syntax:
t ::= case x(u; :::; u) of (c! t; :::; c! t) j c
u ::= x; :::; x:t
These Bohm trees correspond, up to the undened 
, to Hyland-Ong's Finite
Canonical Forms of PCF [11].
The typing rules for intuitionistic Bohm trees are:
t : ( ;A
x
1
1
; :::; A
x
n
n
` C)
x
1
; :::; x
n
:t : (  ` A
1
; :::; A
n
!C)
Abs
c is in C
` c : (  ` C)
Cst
u
1
: (  ` A
1
) : : : u
n
: (  ` A
n
) t
1
: (  ` C) : : : t
p
: (  ` C)
case x(u
1
; :::; u
n
) of (c
1
! t
1
; :::; c
p
! t
p
) : (  ` C)
App
with (A
1
; :::; A
n
!C
0
)
x
in   and C
0
= fc
1
; :::; c
p
g
5.2 Weak-Head Reduction
Environments in the intuitionistic case do not name the continuations:
s ::= t[e]
e ::= w; :::;w
w ::= (~x ~u;~c!
~
t)[e]
The (annotated) rules of reduction dier slightly from the ones of classical
case. The rst rules becomes
case x
ij
(~u) of (~c!
~
t)[e]
wh(n)=[
p
j
 !
1
t
0
[(~y  ~u;~c!
~
t)
n
[e]; e
i
]
with e = w
1
; :::;w
r
and w
i
= (~x
i
 ~u
i
; ~c
i
!
~
t
i
)
p
[e
i
] and u
ij
= ~y:t
0
. The second
becomes
c
j
[e]
wh(n)=]
p
c
i
 !
1
t
ij
[()
n
[ ]; e
i
]
with e = w
1
; :::;w
r
and w
i
= (~x
i
 ~u
i
; ~c
i
!
~
t
i
)
p
[e
i
] is the rst non dummy
window (starting fromw
1
). Thus, intuitionistic PCF returns constants to the last
pushed continuation while classical PCF allows to bypass an arbitrary number
of continuations.
5.3 Intuitionistic Games
Intuitionistic E-dialogues are E-dialogues where legal positions should satisfy
another extra rule.
- Last asked rst answered condition.
Let d
n
= ]
p
n
c
an answer, and n
0
such that p
n
< n
0
< n. If d
n
0
is an
attack then there is n
00
such that n
0
< n
00
< n and d
n
00
= ]
n
0
c
00
for
some c
00
. If d
n
0
= ]
p
n
0
c
0
is an answer then p
n
0
6= p
n
.
Similarly, we get intuitionistic spread E-dialogues by adding the above extra
condition to the rules of (classical) spread E-dialogues.
5.4 Debate
The denitions of the debates d
E
and d
S
are the same for intuitionistic and
classical games. Moreover, the propositions 2 and 3 and the corollaries 7 and 9
still hold in the intuitionistic case.
Intuitionistic spread E-dialogues can be understood as Hyland-Ong's games
where the innocence condition on strategies is now a rule of the game. As a
consequence, all spread E-O-strategies are innocent in our games and therefore
in one-to-one correspondence with families of intuitionistic Bohm trees. On the
other side, denability for Hyland-Ong's games states that even against a non-
innocent opponent (for instance a non-deterministic player), we still have the
bijection between P-strategies and Bohm trees.
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